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INTRODUCTION

Organized crime has long wielded a powerful influence over legitimate American business. Historically, organized crime in the
United States involved blatantly unlawful conduct such as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, and trafficking in narcotics. More
recently, however, organized crime has found its roots in otherwise
lawful activity. In this way, organized crime may successfully enmesh itself in legitimate business and thus camouflage its true activity and source of revenue. A hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds or a pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution
exemplifies the situations in which lawful and unlawful activity are
inexorably intertwined in an attempt to legitimize the unlawful
side of the business and thereby immunize it from civil or criminal
prosecution.
Congress has struggled for over four decades with its goal of
eradicating organized crime in America.1 This attempt to wipe out
organized crime stems from the adverse effects corrupt organizations have on legitimate competing enterprises. 2 Recognizing that
organized crime is often associated with otherwise lawful activity,
1. Since the early 1950's, Congress has investigated the influence of organized crime on
legitimate American business. See infra notes 6, 7, 9 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).3
By assembling a list of crimes and linking them as "predicate
acts"4 in a continuing criminal enterprise, Congress enabled a prosecutor to destroy an otherwise lawful enterprise when the enterprise commits two predicate acts within a ten-year period. The following diagram illustrates the manner in which RICO renders an
enterprise a criminal enterprise:
TWO PREDICATE ACTS WITHIN TEN YEARS + ENTERPRISE (LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL) = CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE (RICO VIOLATION)
As the equation demonstrates, the commission of at least two
predicate acts within a ten-year period renders the operation of the
enterprise unlawful. It is the use or the operation of the enterprise
to commit the predicate acts that is prohibited. Upon a finding
that at least two predicate acts are committed, the operation of the
enterprise constitutes criminal activity.
In the context of the hypothetical hardware store funded by
loan sharking proceeds, the illicit funding of the store constitutes
the requisite predicate acts, rendering the operation of the hardware store unlawful under RICO substantive provisions. In the
case of the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution, the commission of at least two acts of prostitution constitutes the requisite
predicate acts. As with the hardware store, the operation of the
pizza parlor constitutes criminal activity under RICO substantive
provisions.
The paradigmatic situation arises in the application of RICO
substantive provisions to the case of a bookstore engaged in the
sale of both obscene and nonobscene material. As the above diagram illustrates, under the statute, the commission of at least two
predicate acts within a ten-year period renders the operation of the
enterprise unlawful. In the context of a bookstore, the sale of at
least two obscene materials within a ten-year period constitutes
the requisite predicate acts in an alleged RICO violation. Upon a
finding that obscene materials have been sold on the premises at
least twice, the use or the operation of the bookstore constitutes
criminal activity. Under RICO substantive provisions, not only the
sale of obscene materials (the predicate offense) but the sale of
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)).
4. For a discussion of predicate acts, see infra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text.
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nonobscene materials becomes unlawful.
The application of RICO substantive provisions to a bookstore
engaged in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene materials
raises First Amendment considerations. Obscene materials are not
protected by the First Amendment. Materials not deemed to be
legally obscene, however, are entitled to the same protection as
other forms of expression.' The application of RICO substantive
provisions to a bookstore in which both obscene and nonobscene
materials are sold differs from that of a hardware store funded by
loan sharking proceeds or a pizza parlor which is used as a place
for prostitution in the activity prohibited under the statute.
In the context of a hardware store, the conduct prohibited is
the operation of the hardware store and the incident sale of materials. Operating the hardware store involves nonexpressive activity,
beyond the scope of the First Amendment. The same is true of the
pizza parlor. That is, the conduct that is rendered criminal, the
operation of the pizza parlor, does not constitute the type of activity protected under the First Amendment. A fundamental difference, however, arises in the context of the hypothetical bookstore.
The prohibited conduct under the statute in this case is the sale of
presumptively protected material and therefore requires an analysis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review.
The application of RICO substantive provisions to a bookstore
engaged in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene material raises
the question whether Congress can render this enterprise a criminal enterprise. In contrast to the hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds or the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution, the sale of presumptively protected reading or viewing material invokes First Amendment scrutiny. This Article will examine
the constitutionality of the prohibited conduct under RICO substantive provisions in the context of the hypothetical bookstore engaged in the sale of obscene and nonobscene material.
II.

RACKETEERING INFLUENCED & CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT

A.

HistoricalPerspective

In the early 1950's, Congress began investigating organized
criminal activity, such as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, and
narcotics trafficking,6 and the influence that activity had on the
5.
6.

See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922

(Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)),
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nation's economic system and its interference with legitimate business.' Because of these investigations, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) of 1970.8 Recognizing that traditional law enforcement methods failed to eradicate organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate American business, 9 Congress subsequently enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as Title IX of OCCA. l0
B.

Purpose

The purpose of RICO is to destroy organized crime "by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."" It is
designed to provide new legal tools of unprecedented scope for an
Section 1 of the Act provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its
power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic process; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken
the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate
and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens ....
7. See The President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967); The President's Comm'n Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report on Organized Crime (1967). See
generally, John L. Koenig, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme
Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821,
822 (1986). See SPECIAL COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1951)(imploring Congress
to adopt measures to counter organized crime); SPECIAL COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1951)(finding that organized crime operates through interstate commerce and influences local authorities in many states). Presidential commissions and congressional committees further reported on the influence of organized crime in the United States.
8. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)(Congressional Statement of Findings
and Purpose)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
9. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 105, 1st Cong., ist Sess. (1969)(President of the United
States stating in a message to Congress that two decades of federal effort against organized
crime had not succeeded in eradicating any of the "families" that controlled the criminal
syndicates).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)).
11. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
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assault upon organized crime and its economic roots. 2 Ironically,
Congress could not adequately define organized crime in the statute.'" As a result, RICO makes the person's conduct the subject of
its prohibitions. As opposed to criminalizing membership in criminal organizations, RICO defines the conduct commonly associated
with organized crime and makes such conduct a violation.' 4
RICO substantive provisions, for example, make it "unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt."' 5 RICO thus prohibits investing in, controlling, or conducting any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or through money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity.' 6
The federal statute defines a pattern of racketeering activity
as the commission of at least two "acts of racketeering activity"
within a ten-year period. 7 These acts, referred to as "predicate
acts," are any crime listed in section 1961 and defined as "racketeering activity."' 8
C. Conduct Prohibitedby RICO Section 1962 of the Federal
Act
Specifically, RICO prohibits four activities: 19 (1) using or investing, directly or indirectly, of any income derived from a pat12. Id. at 923.
13. 116 CONG. REC. 18,912, 18,913 (1970)(statement of Sen. McClellan); see id. at
35,204 (statement of Rep. Poff)(organized crime impossible to define). Legislative history
indicates that the failure of Congress to define organized crime stemmed from its desire to
eradicate organized and systemic criminal activity, not occasional acts of criminal conduct.
Id. at 32,205.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c)(1988).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(1988).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c)(1988).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)(1988). Legislative history indicates that Congress intended
"pattern" to mean connected and periodic, not separate and erratic. S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)(stating that "[o]ne isolated 'racketeering activity' was thought
insufficient to trigger the remedies under the proposed chapter" and that "the target of [the
legislation] is thus not sporadic activity"). The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479 (1985), however, held that the government need
only allege two violations of prohibited predicate acts; it need not be satisfied by two prior
convictions of predicate acts. Id. at 488-89.
18. Prohibited "racketeering activities" include murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery extortion, and dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(A) (1988).
19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d)(1988).
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tern of racketeering activity through collection of unlawful debt to
acquire any interest in, or to establish or operate any enterprise
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce;2" (2) acquiring or maintaining, directly or indirectly, of any interest in or control of any
enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through a
pattern of racketeering activity, or through collection of an unlawful debt;2 (3) conducting or participating in the affairs of any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful
debt;22 and (4) conspiring to violate any of the aforementioned
provisions.2 3
D. RICO Substantive Provisions Under Section 1962
Under the statute, the use of an enterprise to commit at least
two predicate acts can render the "operation" of the "enterprise"
unlawful. 24 It is the use of the enterprise to commit the racketeering act that is prohibited. 5 Upon a finding that the enterprise
committed at least two predicate acts, RICO substantive provisions render the enterprise a criminal enterprise and the operation
of the enterprise, because it is determined to be criminal, criminal
activity.2 6 Otherwise lawful acts of the enterprise, whether they are
predominant or merely incidental to the business, become part of
the enterprise and also constitute criminal activity.27 In the context of a hardware store funded by loan sharking proceeds, for example, the operation of the hardware store, whether or not it is the
predominant activity of the enterprise, constitutes criminal
activity.
Similarly, in the case of a bookstore engaged in the sale of
both obscene and nonobscene material, whether the primary function of the store is the sale of nonobscene material is irrelevant
under the statute. The sale of two or more pieces of obscene material on the premises within a ten-year period nevertheless renders
the operation of the bookstore criminal activity.
20. See Id. at § 1962(a).
21. Id. at § 1962(b).
22. Id. at § 1962(c).
23. Id. at § 1962(d).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 19-23.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(1988). See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
26. See supra text accompanying note 15.
27. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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E. RICO Punishment Power Under Section 1963
29
28
RICO provides both criminal penalties and civil remedies
for violation of its substantive provisions. One of the most important of the remedies and penalties available to prosecutors is the
forfeiture of assets acquired through a pattern of racketeering activity.3 0 Thus, as part of the criminal penalties, RICO forfeiture
provisions allow for the separation of the defendant from the criminal enterprise and the permanent closure of that enterprise.

F. Expansion of Predicate Acts
Violations

to Include Obscenity

Initially, the federal statute did not contain the predicate offense of obscenity violations. In an attempt to combat the dissemination of obscene books and materials,3 1 Congress amended the
28. Section 1963(a) provides: "Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this
chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the
violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life
imprisonment), or both . . " 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 1990).
29. Civil remedies include awarding treble damages to persons with business or property injuries that arise out of a RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1988).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(1988 & Supp. 1990). Section 1963 (d) provides district courts
with jurisdiction to enter restraining orders pursuant to Section 1963(a) actions. Section
1963(e) authorizes the Attorney General to seize property forfeited under this section. It
requires forfeiture of:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962;
(2) any (A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of Section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of Section 1962.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other
sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a
defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than
twice the gross profits or other proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(3)(1988 & Supp. 1990). See
also United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985)(holding forfeiture mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) after finding that appellant's property was used to promote racketeering).
31. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984)(codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(1990))(obscenity crimes added to definition of racketeering activity after research
indicated that organized crime syndicates were involved in pornography trade).
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statute to include as a predicate offense, "any act . . . involving
. . . dealing in obscene matter. . . which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year...
*"32 Congress based this expansion on the arguable connection between pornography and organized crime.3 3
"Obscenity is not a synonym for pornography." 34 Pornography
refers generally to sexually explicit material and should be distinguished from obscenity, which is a legal term of art that refers to
materials not protected by the First Amendment because they fall
within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller v. California.5 Legally obscene materials, therefore, may
be regulated or banned by state and federal government.36 Unlike
obscenity, however, sexually explicit materials are entitled to the
same protection as other forms of expression.3s
Perhaps ironically, however, obscene materials are often sold
by an enterprise engaged in the sale of presumptively protected
First Amendment materials.3 8 The use of RICO substantive provi32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)(1990). In 1984, Congress extended the list of predicate acts
under RICO to include violations of both federal obscenity code and generic state provisions
prohibiting "dealing in obscene matter." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1990).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1988 & Supp. 1990). In proposing the inclusion of state and
federal obscenity violations as predicate offenses under the federal RICO statute, Senator
Helms stated:
We are experiencing an explosion in the volume and availability of pornography
in our society. Today it is almost impossible to open mail, turn on the television,
or walk in the downtown areas of our cities, or even in some suburban areas,
without being accosted by pornographic materials. The sheer volume and pervasiveness of pornography of our society tends to make adults less sensitive to the
traditional value of chaste conduct and leads children to abandon the moral values their parents have tried so hard to instill in them.
130 CONG. REC. 5433 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1984)(statement of Sen. Helms).
34. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 9 (1981). Obscenity is a
legal term of art that refers to indecency and filth. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 595. For the Supreme Court's current definition of

obscenity, see infra text accompanying notes 76-79. Pornography, on the other hand, refers
generally to sexually explicit adult material that depicts women as prostitutes and focuses
on the role of women in providing sexual pleasure to men. Sunstein, supra, at 595.
35. 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
36. See John J. O'Donnell, RICO Forfeitureand Obscenity: PriorRestraint or Subsequent Punishment?,56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1988)(citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973)).
37.

See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)(free speech and press clauses

of the First Amendment protect sexually explicit materials but exclude materials deemed to
be legally obscene).
38. This constitutional quagmire may in fact further the government's interests. In
1988, for example, the Justice Department stated that it planned to seek more racketeering

indictments in order to close down major distributors of pornography. See Philip Shenon,
Justice Dept. Plans Anti-Racketeering Drive Against Pornography,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1988, at A16. See also O'Donnell, supra note 36, at 1101-02.
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sions to combat obscenity implicates constitutional considerations
of freedom of speech and the press under the First Amendment.
RICO substantive provisions must therefore be examined for their
operation and effect on nonobscene materials.
G. Application of RICO Substantive Provisions Using Obscenity Predicates to an Enterprise Selling Presumptively Protected First Amendment Material
Congress' expansion of predicate offenses to include the dissemination of obscene material as applied to an enterprise engaged
in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene material raises serious
constitutional issues. RICO substantive provisions render an enterprise selling obscene materials a criminal enterprise,3 9 and the continued operation of that enterprise when obscene materials have
been sold at least twice on the premises, constitutes criminal
activity.4 °
In the context of a bookstore, therefore, RICO substantive
provisions using obscenity predicates render the bookstore itself a
criminal enterprise over and above such criminal prosecutions as
may arise from the actual sale of obscene materials. Consequently,
the operation of the bookstore constitutes criminal activity; the
sale of obscene material and nonobscene material both constitute
part of the criminal enterprise. The owner or operator of the enterprise is ultimately punished under the statute not only for the
commission of the predicate offense - dissemination of obscene
material - but for the operation of an enterprise which is engaged
in the sale of material protected by the First Amendment.
This result leads to the question of whether Congress can constitutionally render an enterprise engaged in the sale of presumptively protected reading or viewing material a criminal enterprise.
If Congress cannot enact laws that result in the prohibition of an
enterprise selling nonobscene material, the expansion of the predicate offenses to include dealing in obscene matter as applied to an
otherwise lawful enterprise selling constitutionally protected material poses grave constitutional consequences.
It is the prohibited operation of an enterprise selling nonobscene material under RICO substantive provisions that triggers
First Amendment scrutiny. This Comment examines the application of RICO substantive provisions to an enterprise selling both
39. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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obscene and nonobscene material. It concludes that this application under the statute violates the First Amendment.
III.

SPEECH PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

A.

ConstitutionalStandard

The First Amendment prohibits the enactment or application
of any law "abridging the freedom of speech.""' The social importance of the protection given speech and the press is long recognized. "The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free
society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless
vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress
and by the States."' 2
While the First Amendment protects sexually explicit materials but excludes materials found to be legally obscene,43 the boundary between materials that are legally obscene and those that are
sexually explicit but protected by the Constitution remains uncertain. Despite the difficulty in defining obscenity, the federal government has utilized several methods in an attempt to eradicate
obscenity. These methods include criminal laws punishing the sale
and distribution of obscene materials, civil injunctive proceedings, 44 nuisance abatement laws,'445 and zoning laws.'6 Since Congress' expansion of the predicate offenses to include obscenity violations, the far-reaching remedies under RICO punishment
provisions have made it the preferred method of both state4 7 and
41. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. First
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..
amendment protection of freedom of expression is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
42. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 Elliot's Debates 571 (1941).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
44. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973).
45. See, e.g., Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and The Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1617-20 (1984).
46. For an extensive discussion of the First Amendment issue raised by the use of
zoning regulations to regulate adult establishments, see generally Recent Developments,
The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Ordinances Regulating Adult Establishments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 328-29 (1986)(Zoning laws must strictly
adhere to requirements that protect First Amendment right.).
47. Federal RICO attempts to prevent organized crime in enterprises dealing with interstate and international business. State RICO focuses on intrastate organized crime. Most
state statutes are nevertheless technically modeled after federal RICO. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988). See also Alvers v. State of Indiana, 489 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
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federal legislatures to eliminate obscenity.4 8
B.

Overview of First Amendment Jurisprudence

First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that issues involving
presumptively protected materials must be decided under carefully
defined parameters with the highest regard for the constitutional
consequences on protected speech.4 9 In Near v. Minnesota,50 for
instance, a newspaper owner challenged the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute5 ' that authorized injunction in restraint of publication of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical.5 2
Under the statute, the publisher was permitted to show in defense that the matter published was true and published "with good
motives and for justifiable ends. '5 3 The Supreme Court held the
statute, "so far as it authorized the [injunction] proceedings. . . to
be an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment," regardless of the question of the truth of
the charges contained in the particular periodical. 4
The Near Court noted that one of the purposes of the statute
was not punishment in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the
offending newspaper or periodical. The reason for the enactment is
that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in
"efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal. '55 It is
the continued publication of scandalous and defamatory matter,
the Court concluded, that constitutes the business and the de56
clared nuisance.
48. Legislative history reveals that Congress intended RICO to be the preferred
weapon of prosecutofs to undermine criminal enterprises. See 116 CONG. REc. 591
(1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (stating that RICO focuses on organizations because individual prosecutions are inadequate methods of combatting organized crime); 115 CONG.
REC. 9567 (1969)(statement of Sen. McClellan)("Constant references have been made to the
frustration resulting when the only consequence of conviction is that organized crime and its
infiltrated organizations are run by a new leader and the organizations which are the real
threat are not affected.").
49. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)(holding that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
50. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
51. MINN. STAT., ch. 285 § 1(b)(1925).
52. Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 722-23.
55. Id. at 711.
56. Id.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1992

11

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:301

The Court rejected the State's attempt to justify the statute as
dealing not with publication per se, but with the business of publishing defamation. "Characterizing the publication as a business,
and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the
constitutional immunity against restraint. ' 57 The Near Court
found that the suppression was accomplished under the statute by
enjoining the publication and that restraint was the object of the
statute."
The Court held that the operation and effect of the statute in
substance was that unless the owner or publisher was able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the
charges were true and published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical was suppressed and further
publication was made punishable as a contempt. This, the Court
held, was the essence of censorship.5 9
While the Court recognized that the freedom of speech and
press clause is not absolute, 0 it emphasized that limitations to
First Amendment protection have been acknowledged only in exceptional cases. 6 1 The Court stressed the possible deleterious consequences of upholding the statute in Near:
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on such
a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible
for the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of
any newspaper could be brought before a court, . . . and required to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of
what he intended to publish, and of his motives, or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion
what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly.
And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship. 2
Similarly, the application of RICO section 1962 to a bookstore
prohibits the operation of the bookstore and consequently the sale
of First Amendment material when two obscene materials are sold
57. Id. at 720.
58. Id. at 712.
59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 716.
61. In Near, the Court acknowledged limitations to the protections of the First
Amendment in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
62. Id. at 721.
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on the premises within a ten year period. Bookstore owners, like
newspapers, are distributors of protected speech. By rendering the
enterprise engaged in the sale of two or more obscene materials
criminal, the otherwise lawful activity of selling books becomes
unlawful.
Applying the Court's rationale in Near,6" it is the use and operation of the bookstore to sell obscene materials that constitutes
the prohibited activity. The effect of the substantive offense is to
prohibit the bookstore owner or operator's First Amendment right
in selling nonobscene materials.
The effects of the RICO substantive provision are far broader
than the effect of the Minnesota statute at issue in Near. Unlike
the statutory violations in Near, RICO violations render the bookstore a criminal enterprise, regardless of a showing that the obscene materials are no longer sold on the premises, or how few obscene materials were sold. Congress' expansion of predicate acts to
include "dealing in obscene matter" becomes the legislative "machinery" alluded to by the Near Court, prohibiting the operation
of the bookstore when two obscene materials are sold on the
premises.
The Near Court reasoned that "[i]f, however, the publisher
has a constitutional right to publish, without prior restraint, an
edition of his newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot be
denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same purpose. He does not lose his right by exercising it."' 64 Similarly, contrary to the application of RICO substantive provisions to a bookstore owner or operator, if such an owner or operator has a right to
sell nonobscene material, he may not "lose [this] right by exercising it." 65 An examination of First Amendment jurisprudence concerning the question whether a bookstore in fact has such a right
follows.
The Supreme Court established modern precedent for the permissible scope of government regulation of sexually explicit materials in Roth v. United States.6 In Roth, the Court considered
whether a federal obscenity statute 7 that prohibits the mailing of
63. For a recent application of the Court's rationale in Near, see City of Paducah v.
Investment Entertainment, 791 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1986). See also infra text accompanying
notes 159-161.
64. Near, 283 U.S. at 720.
65. Id.
66. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)(Court first addressed the constitutionality of a criminal
obscenity statute).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1991). The statute provided, in pertinent part: "Every obscene,

Published by Institutional Repository, 1992

13

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:301

obscene material violates the First Amendment. The dispositive
question, the Court concluded, was "whether obscenity is utterance
within the area of protected speech and press." 8 Under carefully
defined parameters, the Court held that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment. The Court recognized, however, the importance in safeguarding First Amendment protection for nonobscene materials:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or
by the States . . . . It is therefore vital that the standards for
judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech
and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests.6 9
Under Roth, the standard for judging obscenity adequate to
withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interests. 70 The standard set out in Roth stemmed from
the notion that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full
protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests."'1
The Supreme Court revised the Roth test in Memoirs v.
72 to include three elements. First, the dominant
Massachusetts
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex. 73 Second, "the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters. 7' 4 Lastly, "the ma75
terial is utterly without redeeming social value.
Since Roth, the Supreme Court has held that there is a prelewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; . . . [i]s
declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not
be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Id.
68. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
69. Id. at 488.
70. Id. at 489.
71. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
72. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
73. Id. at 418.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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sumption that sexually explicit material, however unappealing it
may be, is protected by the First Amendment. "6 Sixteen years after
the decision in Roth, the Supreme Court in Miller v. California"
again redefined the constitutional boundaries on government regulation of sexually explicit materials. "[S]tatutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we
now confine the permissible scope of such [government] regulation
to works which depict or describe sexual conduct [and which meet
the following three-part test]. 17 8 The Supreme Court rejected the
definition of obscenity as expressed in Memoirs and delineated instead the following three-part test:
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 79
Miller remains the prevailing constitutional standard when assessing whether material is obscene.
C. The effect of RICO Substantive Provisions Using Obscenity Predicates on Protected Speech
The Supreme Court's decisions from Roth to Miller exclude
obscenity from First Amendment scrutiny and establish an arguably ascertainable standard by which to judge a work obscene. First
Amendment jurisprudence establishes, however, that valid laws
regulating obscenity may not ignore constitutional safeguards
designed to prohibit the suppression of presumptively protected
speech.
Historically, restrictions on speech have been examined for
prior restraint violations. A prior restraint in speech suppresses an
act or an expression before it enters the market place. 0 There are
two types of prior restraints: 1) a court injunction that prevents a
76. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
77. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
79. Id. at 24-25.
80. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of PriorRestraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REv. 11 (1980).

Published by Institutional Repository, 1992

15

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:301

person from engaging in certain types of communication, 8 1 and 2)
before one may engage in a particrestraints that require a8 license
2
ular form of expression.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that rigorous procedural safeguards must be employed before expressive materials can
be seized as "obscene." 8 The Court first examined the application
of "prior restraint" on sexually explicit materials in Marcus v.
Search Warrant,8 4 wherein the Court invalidated confiscation of
expressive materials seized pursuant to a valid search warrant but
without an adversarial hearing on the question of obscenity.
In Marcus, under proceedings pursuant to certain Missouri
statutes, 5 a city police officer filed a sworn complaint that each of
the appellants, a wholesale distributor of magazines, newspapers,
and books, and the operators of five retail newsstands, kept "obscene" publications for sale. 6 In an ex parte proceeding, without
granting appellants a hearing or even seizing any of the publications in question, the trial judge issued search warrants authorizing
the officers to search appellants' premises and "seize" all "obscene" material.8 7
The officers seized all copies of any publications which in their
judgment were obscene. Appellants moved to quash the search
warrants for return of the seized publications and for suppression
of their use in evidence, on the ground that their seizure violated
the protection of free speech and press clause guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The trial court denied appellants' motions. The trial court found that 100 of the seized publications
were obscene and ordered their destruction. The court also found
that 180 were not obscene and ordered their return. The state supreme court sustained the validity of these orders.8 9
The United States Supreme Court held that the search and
seizure procedures lacked sufficient safeguards to protect nonobscene materials and reversed the judgment.9 0 "A state is not free to
adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity
without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1931).
See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 n.1 (1965).
Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62 (1989).
367 U.S. 717 (1961).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.380 et. seq. (1955)(repealed 1974).
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 731.
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protected speech."9 1
Similar to Marcus, the Supreme Court in A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas,92 invalidated the confiscation of books and films when
copies of selected books were seized without a prior adversarial
hearing on their obscenity. 93 In these cases and those immediately
following, the Court established that pretrial seizures of expressive
materials could only be undertaken pursuant to procedures
'94
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.
This may be accomplished by utilizing the least restrictive methods which would infringe upon protected speech. The forfeiture of
obscene materials, for instance, and fines imposed on the owner or
operator of the bookstore, would ensure First Amendment protection of presumptively protected speech.
The Court later refined that approach. Most importantly, in
Heller v. New York, 95 the Court noted that "seizing films to destroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a very
different matter from seizing a single copy of a film for the bona
fide purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal
'96
proceeding.
Thus, while a single copy of a book or film may be seized and
retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable
cause, the publication may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an
adversarial hearing.9 7 The Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland98 delineated the minimum due process owed to individuals
91. Id. at 730-31. The Marcus Court noted the state's limited power to suppress obscenity given the constitutional protections for free expression:
We therefore held that a State may not impose absolute criminal liability on a
bookseller for the possession of obscene material, even if it may dispense with
the element of scienter in dealing with such evils as impure food and drugs ...
There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors of
food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional guarantees
of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a similar
requirement on the bookseller.
Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-153 (1959)).
92. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
93. Id. at 208.
94. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
95. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
96. Id. at 492 (emphasis in the original).
97. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874-876 (1986).
98. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman,the defendant was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for prior approval. The defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Maryland motion
picture censorship statute. Id. at 52. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66A, § 2, (1957) provides, in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture
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deprived of expressive materials prior to a judgment:
First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must
assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is protected expression. Second,
once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited
pending judicial review, however protracted . . . .Third, it is
abundantly clear that the Maryland statute provides no assurance of prompt judicial determination. 9
While the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that
any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes
may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant in
various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected are involved.' 00 The Supreme Court therefore has
recognized that certain activities of commercial distribution are
presumptively protected under the doctrine of prior restraint. Notwithstanding this recognition, however, the Court has held that the
First Amendment does not preclude closure of a bookstore when it
engages in criminal conduct not protected by the First
Amendment.
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,10 the defendants operated an
adult bookstore that sold sexually explicit publications and had
booths available for viewing sexually explicit movies. 02 In addition
to the sale of sexually explicit materials, illicit solicitation of prostitution occurred on the premises. 0 3 A New York statute authorized the closure of a building found to be a public health nuisance
if the building was used as a place for prostitution and lewdness. 04
The statute did not provide for the seizure of the contents of the
building. 10 5 The defendants argued that closing the bookstore interfered with their First Amendment rights to sell nonobscene
books on the premises. 0 6
film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been submitted by the
exchange owner or lessee of the film or view and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State Board of Censors."
Freedman,380 U.S. at 52 n.1. The defendant argued that the statute was an invalid prior
restraint because the censorship board could ban a film without a prompt judicial review.
The Court concluded that the Maryland procedural scheme did not satisfy these criteria.
99. 380 U.S. at 59-60.
100. Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 US 319, 326 n. 5 (1979).
101. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
102. Id. at 698.
103. Id. at 698-99.
104. Id. at 699-700 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2320, 2329 (McKinney 1985)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 700.
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The Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that the factual situation in Arcara did not trigger application of the First
Amendment.10 7 The Arcara court reasoned that the sexual activity
that occurred on the bookstore premises involved nonexpressive
activity, beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. The
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar closure of the
bookstore, because the sale of books in an establishment that was
used for prostitution does not confer First Amendment coverage to
defeat a valid statute which is aimed at terminating illegal uses of
premises." 8
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the difference
between a bookstore where prostitution occurred and a bookstore
selling obscene books: "If. . . a city were to use a nuisance statute
as a pretext for closing down a bookstore because it sold indecent
books. . the case would clearly implicate First Amendment concerns and require analysis under the appropriate First Amendment
standard of review."' 0 9
The First Amendment standard of review should not be applied, Justice O'Connor reasoned, where, as here, the government
is regulating neither speech nor an incidental nonexpressive effect
of speech. The hypothetical hardware store funded by loan sharking proceeds, and the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution,
fall within Justice O'Connor's rationale: the activities involved constitute neither speech nor an incidental nonexpressive effect of
speech. Justice O'Connor illustrates, however, how the analysis differs in the context of a bookstore engaged in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene material. This case, Justice O'Connor explains, would require First Amendment analysis.
The prophecy of Justice O'Connor's words in Arcara come to
fruition when RICO substantive provisions using obscenity predicates are applied to a bookstore engaged in selling presumptively
protected material. Unlike the solicitation of prostitution, the sale
of books "implicate First Amendment concerns and requires analysis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review. ' ' °
First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that a sanction against
an adult bookstore that suppresses protected speech, as well as unprotected obscenity, acts as a prior restraint and violates the book107.

Id. at 707.

108. Id.
109.
opinion.
110.

Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens joined in the concurring
Id.
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store owner's First Amendment rights."'
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal criminal statute that prohibited the sale of both
obscene and nonobscene, although "sexually explicit" or indecent
telephone messages. In Sable Communications of California v.
FCC,"2 the Court upheld the criminal prohibition against obscene
messages but struck down the ban on nonobscene messages."' The
Court observed: "Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment; and the [government]
do [es] not submit that the sale of such materials 4to adults could be
criminalized solely because they are indecent.""1
While the Supreme Court has held that the standards governing regulation of allegedly obscene books and materials should
not differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling,
and other contraband, the Court has emphasized that an order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be framed in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by the constitutional mandate. These terms must also
meet the essential needs of the public order. 1 5 This Comment suggests that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny, the objective is
best accomplished through narrowly-drawn procedures that do not
interfere with the continued sale of presumptively protected
materials." 6
D. Analysis of RICO's Effect on Protected Speech
The prohibited activity under RICO substantive provisions
must be examined against the backdrop of the foregoing First
Amendment jurisprudence. A conviction for a violation of section
1962(a) requires proof that the accused (1) conducted (2) an enterprise (3) affecting interstate commerce (4) through a pattern (5) of
111. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
112. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
113. Id. at 117.
114. Id. at 126.
115. Id. The Sable Court emphasized that while the government may regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest, it must
choose the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. See also Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)(Court struck down
a ten day restraining order, issued ex parte and without notice to petitioners, against a rally
organized by a white supremacist group).
116. See, e.g., State v. Feld, 745 P.2d 146, 153-154 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)("While the
court could constrain a defendant from moving inventory in its entirety, it could not interfere with continued exhibitions or sales").
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racketeering activity.117
In the context of Justice O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore in
Arcara,1 18 the activity prohibited by section 1962 is the use of the
bookstore to sell obscene materials. Under the federal statute,
therefore, the sale of two or more obsence materials by a bookstore's owners or operators constitutes the requisite predicate acts
on which the criminal racketeering activity is based.
Under section 1962(c), a determination that the materials sold
are obscene renders the bookstore a criminal enterprise. The dissemination of presumptively protected materials constitutes part
of the criminal enterprise and thereby renders the sale of presumptively protected material criminal activity. The federal statute,
therefore, represents an expansion of the government regulation of
obscene materials to government regulation of both obscene and
nonobscene materials when sold by the same enterprise. Congress
has the power to criminally prohibit the dissemination of obscenity
under the Constitution.""9 The conduct criminally prohibited by
RICO substantive provisions, however, is the operation of a business selling obscene materials when that business sells at least two
materials deemed obscene. When that enterprise is a bookstore,
selling both obscene and nonobscene materials, "a conviction for
that operation violates the First Amendment." 120 As Justice Stevens aptly noted in Fort Wayne Books:
For there is a difference of constitutional dimension between an
enterprise that is engaged in the business of selling and exhibiting books, magazines, and videotapes and one that is engaged in
another commercial activity, lawful or unlawful. A bookstore receiving revenue from sales of obscene books is not the same as a
hardware store or a pizza parlor funded by loan-sharking proceeds. The presumptive First Amendment protection accorded
the former does not apply either
to the predicate offense or to
121
the business use in the latter.
The section that follows is a necessary excursion from the
First Amendment discussion, focusing on the scope of government
regulation of speech and judicial reaction to this expansion.
117. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 928 (1983).
118. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See also supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
120. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 14.
121. 489 U.S. 46, 84-85 (1989)(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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THE EXPANDED GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF EXPRESSIVE

MATERIALS UNDER SECTION

1962

AND THE SUPREME COURT'S

SCRUTINY OF THE EXPANDED GOVERNMENT REGULATION

In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,2

the Supreme Court

reviewed two decisions of the Indiana courts involving the applica-

tion of that state's RICO and Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity (CRRA) Acts to cases involving bookstores selling allegedly
obscene materials. 12 The complaint recited thirty-nine criminal
convictions for selling obscene publications from the three
stores.' 2 ' Petitioner, Fort Wayne Books, Inc., and two other corpo-

rations, each operated an "adult bookstore" in Fort Wayne,
Indiana.
On March 19, 1984, the State of Indiana and a local prosecutor
filed a civil action against three corporations and certain of their

employees. 1 25 The complaint alleged that defendants had engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating the
state laws barring the distribution of obscene books and films,
thereby violating the state's RICO law. 28 A 1984 amendment to
the state RICO law added obscenity violations to the list of predicate offenses to constitute "racketeering activity" under Indiana
7
law.

2

Fort Wayne Books was charged with six substantive obscenity
violations and two RICO offenses. Challenging the two RICO offenses, Fort Wayne Books raised no objection to the obscenity indictments.

28

Rather, Fort Wayne Books advanced two arguments

122. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). Fort Wayne Books was actually a consolidation of two cases
on the intermediate and state supreme court levels: 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d
559 (Ind. 1987), which originated in the Marion Circuit Court, and Fort Wayne Books, Inc.
v. State, which originated in the Allen County Court. 4447 Corporation v. Goldsmith did not
join Fort Wayne Books in seeking Supreme Court review of the Indiana Supreme Court
decision; the Supreme Court's decision focuses exclusively on the facts of the Fort Wayne
Books case.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id. at 51.
125. Id. at 50-51.
126. Id. at 51. The "racketeering activities" forbidden by the Indiana RICO law are a
"pattern" of multiple violations of certain substantive crimes, of which distributing obscenity is one. IND. CODE § 35-49-3-1 (1988). Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 57.

127.

See

IND. CODE

§ 35-45-6-1 (1988).

128. Fort Wayne Books made no claim that the Constitution bars a criminal prosecution for distributing obscene material. 489 U.S. at 54. Indeed, the Fort Wayne Books Court
noted that the constitutionality of criminal sanctions against those who distribute obscene
materials has been well established by prior cases. Id. at 54. citing, Pinkus v. United States,
436 U.S. 293, 303-304 (1978); Spawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 597-599 (1977); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1973); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441
(1957).
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attacking the facial validity of the Indiana RICO statute's use of
obscenity violations as predicate acts for a RICO conviction. First,
Fort Wayne Books argued that the Indiana RICO law, as applied
to an "enterprise" that has allegedly distributed obscene materials,
is unconstitutionally vague; 1 9 and, second, that the potential punishments available under the RICO law are so severe that the statute lacks "a necessary sensitivity to First Amendment rights."' 3 0
The Supreme Court explicitly declined, despite petitioners' request, to rule on the question of the constitutionality of the postjudgment forfeiture authorized by the Indiana RICO/CRRA statutes.""' The Court noted that since neither appealed case involved
such a forfeiture, "[tihese claims could only be reviewed when (or
if) such remedies are enforced."'' 2 The Court held that the pretrial
seizure of petitioner's bookstore and its contents was improper because there was no determination that the seized items were "obscene" or that a RICO violation had occurred. 133
While the constitutionality of post-judgment remedies as applied to the predicate offense of obscenity was not decided in Fort
Wayne Books, it was presented and decided in United States v.
Pryba.'13 The Prybas owned and operated nine video rental stores
and three bookstores in Northern Virginia. Following a jury trial,
the Prybas were convicted of various offenses relating to the sale of
obscene videotapes and obscene magazines. 3 5 The Prybas ap129. Petitioner argued that the "inherent vagueness" of the standard established by
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), is at the root of his objection to any RICO prosecution based on predicate acts of obscenity. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 87-614, at 24-33.
130. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 870614, at 23.
131. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 60.
132. Id. Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion joined by Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall, dissented from the Court's opinion in the Sappenfield case and concurred in part
and dissented in part from the Court's Fort Wayne Books decision. Justice Stevens argued
that the questions relating to the severity of the post-judgment forfeiture remedies were
ripe for review. "The significance of making obscenity a predicate offense comparable to
murder, kidnapping, extortion, or arson cannot be evaluated fairly if the CRRA portion of
the RICO/CRRA scheme is ignored." Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 63. The Court stated that mere probable cause to believe that a violation
had transpired is inadequate to remove books or films from circulation. Id. at 66. "Where
the claimed RICO violation is a pattern of racketeering that can be established only by
rebutting the presumption that expressive materials are protected by the First Amendment,
that presumption is not rebutted until the claimed justification for seizing such materials is
properly established in an adversary proceeding." Id. at 67.
134. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 305 (1990).
135. Dennis E. Pryba and Barbara A. Pryba, husband and wife, were each convicted of
one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (participating in a pattern of racketeering activity); one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (employed by a criminal enterprise engaged in
racketeering activities); one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)(conspiracy to violate §
1962(a)); seven counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (transportation of obscene materials in

Published by Institutional Repository, 1992

23

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:301

pealed their conviction and raised constitutional challenges to the
forfeiture provisions of the federal RICO statute.1 3 6 The heart of
the government's case consisted of the introduction of the tapes
and magazines that were alleged to be obscene.1 3 7 At trial, the jury
found six of the nine magazines and four video tapes that had been
rented or purchased to be obscene.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the forfeiture provision of the federal RICO statute was
constitutional. 3 8 The court reasoned that the provision did not act
as a prior restraint on free speech because the defendants had an
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether the speech was obscene
prior to the forfeiture. The court, deciding that the materials were
obscene, seized the materials as a subsequent punishment for the
defendant's criminal conduct. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 3 '
Constitutional attacks on the application of obscenity predicates to enterprises engaging in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene presumptively protected material have focused on the
penalties imposed for criminal conduct under the federal RICO
statute. Appellate courts have relied upon Fort Wayne Books and
Pryba to summarily dismiss these challenges. By contrast, this
Comment. argues that it is the substantive offense under section
1962 of the statute, and not the penalties imposed under section
1963, that pose constitutional problems. This argument was recently presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Alexander 4 0
V.

A.

UNITED STATES V. ALEXANDER

Factual History

In United States v. Alexander, the petitioner, Ferris J. Alexinterstate commerce for sale and distribution). Jennifer G. Williams was acquitted on Count
I, violation of § 1962(a), but convicted of all of the remaining counts. Educational Books,
Inc. was convicted of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and one count of violating
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). All defendants appealed their judgments. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 750.
136. The Prybas also raised issues concerning the use of the prior state obscenity convictions of Educational Books, Inc. to prove predicate acts of racketeering, and various rulings the trial court made in the admission of evidence and in the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 750.
137. The indictments were brought following an obscenity investigation during which
investigators opened memberships with video retail centers and rented or purchased sexually explicit video tapes and magazines. Id. at 750.
138. Id. at 755-56.
139. 111 S.Ct. 305 (1990).
140. 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991).
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ander, Sr., was convicted on twenty-four counts of a forty-one

count indictment, including the sale of obscene magazines and
videos, and operating an enterprise selling obscene materials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.1'4 Alexander was in the adult entertainment business for more than thirty years, selling magazines,
showing movies, and selling and renting video cassettes. 142 Alexander's business, which the government charged was a RICO "enterprise," consisted of thirteen rental stores and one wholesale distributorship, selling millions of dollars of these materials each
year. 1 43 Of all this material, the jury found four magazines and
three videotapes sold by his business to be obscene.' 44 The sale of
these seven obscene materials constituted the predicate acts on
which Alexander's RICO convictions were based.' 45
The court sentenced Alexander to six years imprisonment for
the RICO violations, imposed a fine of 100,000 dollars, and ordered
Alexander to pay the costs of his prosecution, incarceration, and
supervised release.' 46 The court also ordered forfeiture of Alexander's interest in his thirteen retail stores and one wholesale distributorship, and forfeiture of 8.9 million dollars in proceeds generated
7
by those businesses during the years 1985 through 1988.'
Alexander appealed his conviction and sentence to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the
constitutional validity, both facially and as applied, of the statutes
on which his obscenity-related convictions and penalties were
based. The three-judge panel rejected Alexander's constitutional
arguments and the appeal of his conviction for the other counts of
his indictment. Alexander petitioned the court for rehearing en
banc of the one issue he claimed was erroneously decided in part
IV of the court's opinion, wherein the court rejected Alexander's
argument that the First Amendment prohibits criminal prosecution and conviction for the operation of a business selling both ob141.

Id. at 826-27. Alexander sought: 1) a declaratory judgment that the application of

the RICO statute to obscenity offenses violated his First Amendment rights, and 2) a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the RICO statute to obscenity offenses.
The district court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. Alexander v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed,
881 F. 2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1989).
142. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 827.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 829.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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scene and nonobscene expressive materials.14 Without further explanation, the court stated: "Alexander was not prosecuted for
selling nonobscene material .
"...149
Recently, the United States
Supreme Court granted petitioner Alexander's request for a writ of
certiorari. 5 ° On January 12, 1993, the Court heard oral arguments. 15 ' The Court certified two questions: first, whether the forfeiture provision under section 1963 constitutes a prior restraint or
otherwise violates the First Amendment, and second, whether the
forfeiture provision is so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 52 Ithas been suggested that during oral argument the court concentrated on the
question of First Amendment considerations rather than the
Eighth Amendment. 5 3 Although the question that was certified
considered the constitutionality of section 1963 under the First
Amendment rather than section 1962, there is no analytical distinction between the two. The government's actions are content
based, thus invalidating the seizure of constitutionally protected
materials.
B.

Eighth Circuit's Opinion

Alexander's First Amendment arguments cannot be understood without first understanding the conduct criminally prohibited by RICO substantive provisions under section 1962(c), the
punishment for that conduct under section 1963, and the prohibitions of the First Amendment.
The court's opinion suggests that Alexander's section 1962(c)
offense consisted of merely selling obscene materials. 54 While the
sale of obscene materials were the predicate offenses charged, the
substantive 1962(c) offense was operating a business which sold
seven obscene magazines and videotapes. Because the business, or
"enterprise" Alexander was accused of operating, also sold millions
of dollars of expressive materials not proved obscene, Alexander
148. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 2.
149. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 834.
150. Alexander, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992).
151. Tony Mauro, Court Ponders Case of ProsecutorialZeal, Jan. 18, 1993, LEGAL
TIMEs

at 8.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The court stated: "We summarily reject Alexander's arguments. The district
courts did not err in rejecting Alexander's invitation to overturn Miller." Id. at 832. While
the court aptly relies on Pryba in support of its contention that "forfeiture provided by 18
U.S.C. § 1467 does not violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 833, this does not end the
inquiry.
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for selling both obscene
argued that he was, in effect, "convicted
1 55
and nonobscene expressive materials.'
On appeal, the government did not dispute this description of
the conduct criminally prohibited by RICO section 1962(c), and
the court did not otherwise refer to the prohibited conduct.'56 The
court's opinion, however, strongly suggests that it confused the
substantive offense prohibited by RICO section 1962(c) with the
punishment imposed by the forfeiture provisions of section 1963.
RICO section 1963 mandates forfeiture of all assets used or
invested in a RICO enterprise. 57 The forfeiture provisions are penalties for violating RICO section 1962. These penalties cannot be
imposed unless and until a defendant has been convicted of a section 1962 violation.' 58 The court in Alexander characterized this
constitutional attack on his conviction for violating section 1962 as
an attack on RICO's forfeiture provisions. "Alexander argues that
the application of the forfeiture provision of section 1962 unconstitutionally criminalizes non-obscene expressive material."' 59
The Alexander court misconstrued the provisions of the RICO
statute. Section 1962 contains no forfeiture provision; the forfeiture provisions are contained in section 1963. "[T]he First Amendment, regardless of the punishment imposed, limits prosecution
for the sale of sexually explicit expressive materials to the sale of
obscene materials only under the Supreme Court's holding in
Miller.6 0
The Eighth Circuit's reference to the "forfeiture provision of
section 1962," was later applied to Alexander's constitutional argument: "Alexander asserts that Sable Communication v. Federal
Communications Commission, . . . further supports his argument
that the application of the RICO forfeiture provision unconstitutionally criminalized the sale of expressive material."''
The FCC statute in Sable contained no forfeiture provisions.
The court's opinion implies that committing the predicate act constitutes the RICO offense and the prohibition against operating the
business was merely punishment for the offense, and not the RICO
155. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 5.
156. The court did not describe the conduct prohibited by RICO section 1962(c) except to summarize the statutory language in a footnote. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 5.
157. Section 1963(a)(3).
158. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 7.
159. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 832.
160. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 7 (emphasis in original).
161. Alexander at 833-34. For a discussion of the Sable decision, see supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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offense itself. Separation of the RICO offense set out in section
1962 (operating the business) from the RICO punishment power
set out in section 1963 (forfeiture provision) is fundamental to an
understanding of the First Amendment concerns presented by section 1962(c). 162 Adhering to this principle, the court's application
of the holding in Pryba seems misplaced. The criminal defendants
in Pryba challenged section 1962 only on grounds of vagueness,
and attacked the RICO forfeiture provision, facially and as applied, on grounds of overbreadth and prior restraint. 6 3
The court's rejection of the Supreme Court's holding in Sable,
apparently failing to separate the substantive crime under section
1962 from the penalties imposed under section 1963, suggests a belief that had the separate bans on obscene and nonobscene phone
messages been combined to ban purveyors who sold both obscene
and nonobscene messages, the Court would have upheld the statute.' 4 The Supreme Court has stated that business purveying sexually explicit speech has First Amendment protection. 6 5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered the question of whether a city ordinance allowing revocation of the license
of any bookseller or movie house possessing or exhibiting both obscene and nonobscene materials violated the First Amendment. In
Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc.,' the court invalidated such an ordinance on First Amendment grounds, holding
that the ordinance's license revocation procedure was invalid because it could result in closing a place of business even though not
all the materials were obscene. The revocation procedure, the court
concluded, constituted a prior restraint of both protected and un67
protected speech.
The Paducah court held that the procedural safeguards concerning the obscene materials were adequate because the license
revocation procedures were not triggered until after a procedural
determination that the material sold was obscene. The license revocation order, however, violated the First Amendment because the
license revocation also restrained nonobscene materials without
162. See Alexander's Reply Brief, at 10.
163. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305
(1990). See also supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
164. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 9.
165. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
166. 791 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
167. 791 F.2d at 465. The appellate court cited approvingly an example given by the
district court: "Under the ordinance a movie theater could be closed for repeatedly showing
an obscene film on weekends even though the theater showed 'The Ten Commandments,'
'Snow White,' and 'Gone With the Wind' on week days." Id.
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proof that they were obscene.6 5 The Eighth Circuit did not address Alexander's constitutional, challenge to RICO section 1962(c)
using obscenity predicates. Whether this section withstands First
Amendment scrutiny, therefore, remains unanswered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Alexander's constitutional challenge to RICO section 1962(c)
violations using obscenity predicates is an attack on the statute as
applied to an "enterprise" engaged in the sale of presumptively
protected materials. The Alexander argument echoes the constitutional problems alluded to in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Arcara.6 9 Justice O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore, Alexander argues, differs from a hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds, or a pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution. Like the solicitation of prostitution, the activity in the above
hypothetical manifests absolutely no element of protected
expression.'7
The significance of the Alexander decision, therefore, emerges
against the backdrop of O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore. RICO
Section 1962(c), by rendering a bookstore that has sold at least two
obscene materials a criminal enterprise, prohibits the future sale of
presumptively protected materials. According to O'Connor, the
case of a bookstore selling obscene material "clearly implicates
First Amendment concerns and requires an analysis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review."' 7 1
In Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, he stated: "Alexander
makes no argument that the sale of obscene materials has First
Amendment protection. The corollary, however, is that the sale of
non-obscene material is protected even when sold at the same store
at which obscene material is sold.' 72 The gravity of the constitutional question presented in part IV of the Alexander opinion is
best illustrated by Justice Brennan's dissent in Maryland v.
Macon:'7 3
[T]he same official use of the power to search and seize [expressive material] sanctioned today in its application against the
168. Id. at 470.
169. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
170. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 105.,
172. Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 10.
173. 472 U.S. 463 (1985)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sexual nonconformist can be instantly turned against the political nonconformist . ... These 'stealthy encroachments' upon

our liberties sanctioned in the State's present effort to combat
effort to shackle
vice may become potent weapons in a future
174
political dissenters and stifle their voices.
If Alexander is appealed to the Supreme Court, a proper analysis of RICO section 1962(c) using obscenity predicates may ensure
the continued protections of the freedom of speech and press guarantees under the First Amendment. If the Supreme Court fails to
untangle the substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c) from
the penalties imposed under section 1963, however, the government's "effort to combat vice '175 may reduce these voices of freedom to distant echoes of a lost era.
76
Amanda M. McGovern1

174.
175.
176.

Id. at 477.
Id. See also supra text accompanying note 144.
J.D., 1992, University of Miami School of Law.
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